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Abstract To what extent have national fiscal policies contributed to the decarbonisation of
newly sold passenger cars?We construct a simple model that generates predictions regarding
the effect of fiscal policies on average CO2 emissions of new cars, and then test the model
empirically. Our empirical strategy combines a diverse series of data. First, we use a large
database of vehicle-specific taxes in 15 EU countries over 2001–2010 to construct a measure
for the vehicle registration and annual road tax levels, and separately, for the CO2 sensitivity
of these taxes. We find that for many countries the fiscal policies have become more sensitive
to CO2 emissions of new cars. We then use these constructed measures to estimate the effect
of fiscal policies on the CO2 emissions of the new car fleet. The increased CO2-sensitivity of
registration taxes have reduced the CO2 emission intensity of the average new car by 1.3%,
partly through an induced increase of the share of diesel-fuelled cars by 6.5 percentage points.
Higher fuel taxes lead to the purchase of more fuel efficient cars, but higher diesel fuel taxes
also decrease the share of (more fuel efficient) diesel cars; higher annual road taxes have no
or an adverse effect.
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1 Introduction
Transport accounts for about 23% of energy-related CO2 emissions (Sims and Schaeffer
2014), and 15% of global greenhouse gas emissions (Blanco et al. 2014). Within the EU,
passenger cars represent about 12% of EU CO2 emissions.1 In the European Commission
launched a strategy to reduce carbon dioxide emission intensity (i.e. emissions per kilometer)
for new cars sold in the European Union. Since then, the emission intensity of new sold cars
has come down remarkably, especially since 2007.2 In 2011, the strategy was updated with
a proposal to reduce EU transport greenhouse gas emissions by 60%, by 2050 as compared
to 1990 levels (European Commission 2011b).
The strategy is based on three pillars. The first pillar targets car manufacturers, requiring
them to reduce the average emissions of new cars. The associated directive, established in
2009, aims to decrease the average emissions of new sold cars to 130 gCO2/km by 2015,
and 95 gCO2/km by 2020 (European Parliament and Council 2009).
3 The second pillar aims
to ensure that the fuel-efficiency information of new passenger cars offered for sale or lease
in the EU is made available to consumers to facilitate an informed choice. Labelling is the
major instrument to provide information on fuel consumption and CO2 emissions of cars.
Directive 1999/94/EC obliges Member States to provide this information and to transpose
the directive into national laws by 18.1.2001 at the latest (European Parliament and Council
1999).
The third pillar aims to influence consumer’s vehicle purchase choices by increasing taxes
on fuel-inefficient cars relative to fuel-efficient cars. The three pillars are expected to reinforce
each other. Increasing the tax burden on fuel-intensive cars, relative to the burden on fuel-
efficient cars (third pillar), and providing information (second pillar) is expected to increase
the sale of fuel-efficient cars, which in turn makes it more profitable for car manufacturers
to produce fuel-efficient cars (the first pillar).
Over the past years, many EU countries implemented the third strategy pillar, by green-
ing the car taxes through either a revision of purchase taxes, company car taxes or annual
road taxes. Contrary to the first and second pillar policies, car taxes, as all other taxes,
are decided on a national level, and as a consequence differ across countries. In 2005,
the European Commission proposed to harmonise national vehicle registration and annual
road taxes (European Commission 2005), but the proposal was rejected by the member
states.
Also the level of, as well as the decline in, the emission intensity of newly purchased cars
greatly varies across the European countries. Take for instance petrol cars. In 2010, average
emissions from new cars ranged from 130 gCO2/km (Portugal) to 160 (Luxembourg). Over
the period 2001–2010, the emission intensity of petrol cars fell by on average 12% across
the EU15. CO2 emissions of new cars have declined most rapidly in Sweden and Denmark.
There are various possible explanations for these different experiences across countries. For
example, the fall in Sweden’s emission intensity may be attributed to domestic policies (Huse
and Lucinda 2013), or to convergence to the EU average, whereas Denmark’s move from
being average to becoming one of the most fuel-efficient countries might be the consequence
of its aggressive car tax policies.
1 See European Commission (2016).
2 See Figs. 1 and 2 in the data description. The anticipation of regulation EC/443/2009 (European Parliament
and Council 2009) is a possible explanation for the downward trend after 2007.
3 All data onCO2 emission/km in this study are determined according to theNEDCguidelines (NewEuropean
Driving Cycle, the prescribed European test cycle).
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In this paper, we exploit the variation in the stringency of vehicle fiscal policies across
countries and time to address the following research question: to what extent have national
fiscal policies contributed to the decarbonisation of newly sold passenger cars? We construct
a simple model of a representative agent to generate predictions regarding the effect of fiscal
policies on average CO2 emissions of new cars. We study changes at the aggregate level
and are interested in differences between countries and changes over time within countries.4
After presenting the model, we build a dataset in which we compare vehicle tax systems
across 15 countries over the years 2001–2010. We use a dataset of vehicle-specific taxes,
and use these data to characterize each country’s tax system at year t . More specifically, we
construct measures for the level and CO2 sensitivity of car taxes so that we can compare
different tax regimes over countries and years. We differentiate taxes by petrol and diesel, so
that we construct 8 variables to provide an elaborate characterization of a country’s vehicle
tax system for a given year. Both the construction of the multiple tax proxies and the multi-
country sample mark important contributions to the empirical literature, which typically has
considered a single-country single-event.5
The constructed variables are used to empirically study the effect of the fiscal treatment,
especially the car purchase tax, on the fuel efficiency of newly sold cars.We identify the effect
by considering dynamic differences between countries in car taxes and in emission intensities.
We control for static differences between countries through country fixed effects, control for
income and for common dynamic patters (e.g. EU policies) through time fixed effects.We can
identify the effect of fiscal policies on car sales as some countries have consistent lowpurchase
taxes (<30% of car prices) that are not very sensitive to CO2 emissions (Belgium, France,
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Sweden, UnitedKingdom), while Spain has low purchase taxes
but these have become substantially more CO2 sensitive over the period 2001–2010. Greece
has high purchase taxes (>30%) but these became less CO2 sensitive over the years, and
the remaining countries (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal) have
relatively high purchase taxes (>30%), with a CO2 component that substantially increased
over the years [>10 e/(gCO2/km)], though the countries differ substantially. Our empirical
strategy is based on the correlation between the uneven developments in taxes and patterns
in the emission intensities for these countries.
Our research has three characteristics,which, combined,make it unique and add to existing
literature: first, unlike most studies, our study deals with the effects of car taxes in multiple
countries, thus controlling for year-specific effects. This makes it easier to generalize our
results. Second, unlike most studies, our study jointly considers three different types of car-
related taxes, i.e. registration taxes, road taxes and fuel taxes. This allows for a better insight
in the effect of different components of car-related taxes. Third, we provide a method to
decompose registration taxes in two parts: the first part measures the level while the second
part measures the CO2-sensitivity. The decomposition allows for a richer analysis.
We find empirical evidence that fiscal vehicle policies significantly affect emission inten-
sities of new bought cars. We find evidence that especially the CO2-sensitivity of registration
taxes and the level of the fuel taxes are important determinants of the emission intensity of new
cars. The diesel–petrol substitution induced by changes in the relative taxes for diesel versus
petrol cars is an important factor for the average fleet’s fuel efficiency.We also find higherCO2
intensities with increasing income and a clear convergence pattern between EU countries.
4 That is, the model and our econometric analysis do not provide a detailed micro foundation of consumers’
decisions; see Berry et al. (1995) or van Meerkerk et al. (2014) for such an analysis.
5 See for instance Hennessy and Tol (2011), Huse and Lucinda (2013), Ciccone (2015), D’Haultfoeuille et al.
(2014), Chugh and Cropper (2014).
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2 Literature
There is an emerging empirical literature on the effects of fiscal policies on the fuel-efficiency
of newly sold cars. The general finding is that fiscal policies are an effective tool to influ-
ence car purchase decisions. In addition, the literature establishes that purchase taxes are
more effective than annual (road) taxes, and that tax reform can cause sizable petrol-diesel
substitution.
A strong example of the responsiveness of car purchases to fiscal policies is provided
by D’Haultfoeuille et al. (2014). They assess the effect of the “feebate” system that existed
in France in 2008 and 2009. In this system, owners of fuel efficient cars could receive a
tax rebate whereas fuel inefficient car owners had to pay a fee. The precise rebate and fee
thresholds showed up remarkably in the sales for different car types, with large sales increases
just below and drops just above the thresholds.
The effectiveness of car taxes can depend on the subtle features of the policy adopted. For
example, compared to annual taxes, vehicle acquisition taxes are more effective in directing
consumers’ buying decisions (Brand et al. 2013; Gallagher and Muehlegger 2011; Klier and
Linn 2015; van Meerkerk et al. 2014). Consumer myopia is considered the main reason for
this discrepancy.6 For fuel costs the evidence is mixed. Where Busse et al. (2013) and Allcott
and Wozny (2014) find that consumers fully value the discounted future fuel costs in their
purchase decisions, other research indicates that, when deciding on whether to purchase a
more fuel efficient car, consumers tend to calculate the expected savings in fuel costs only
for about 3 years (see Greene et al. 2005; Kilian and Sims 2006; Greene et al. 2013).
Another phenomenon identifiedby the literature is the policy-induced substitutionbetween
petrol and diesel cars. Diesel engines are typically more efficient than petrol engines. Hence,
when Ireland differentiated its purchase and annual road taxes according to CO2 emission
intensities, sales of diesel cars increased, particularly at the expense of large petrol cars
(Hennessy and Tol 2011; Rogan et al. 2011; Leinert et al. 2013). In addition to contributing
to a reduction in averageCO2 emissions, this unanticipated shift towards diesel cars caused an
increase in NOx emissions (Leinert et al. 2013). Similar effects have been found in Norway,
where a vehicle acquisition tax reform caused a 23 percentage point increase in the diesel
market share (Ciccone 2015).
All research discussed above analyses the effect of specific vehicle tax policies in a single
country. Hence, these papers cannot control for year-specific effects and the results are not
easily generalizable. Specifically, single-country estimates may conflate domestic policies
with external changes, e.g. EU-wide developments such as efficiency improvements brought
by theEUdirective 443/2009 onCO2 standards.7 In our empirical strategy,we can identify the
fiscal effects as year fixed effects absorb the effects of the common policies and technological
developments. That is, our empirical analysis does not consider a single-event in one country,
yet studies more broadly the fiscal treatment of car purchases and ownership in relation to
car emissions. There are some previous cross-country and panel-data studies on the effect of
fuel prices on fuel efficiency (Burke and Nishitateno 2013; Klier and Linn 2013). The effect
of the registration and road tax level on car purchases is previously studied in Ryan et al.
(2009), who use a panel structure for EU countries. They conclude that vehicle taxes, notably
registration taxes, are likely to have significantly contributed to reducing CO2 emission
6 Consumer myopia, also known as nearsightedness, captures the notion that boundedly rational consumers
do not exploit all available information equally, and tend to give more weight to short-term costs and benefits
(DellaVigna 2009).
7 For instance, Mabit (2014) argues that in Denmark, the biggest contribution to the sales of fuel-efficient cars
is probably not the 2007 tax reform, but technological improvements.
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intensities of new passenger cars. Ryan et al. (2009) focus on the average level of registration
taxes in a country.8 We take this analysis one step further by constructing measures of the
CO2 sensitivity in addition to the level of registration and road taxes. This allows us to exploit
differences between EU countries in the stringency and timing of CO2-related vehicle fiscal
policies. An important part of our study is thus a more comprehensive characterization of the
vehicle tax system that can be used to compare differences across countries and changes over
time, based on a large dataset of country–year–vehicle specific prices inclusive and exclusive
of taxes.
3 Model
We illustrate the effect of vehicle purchase taxes on the average emission intensity with a
simple model. We consider two car types. A representative consumer9 maximises (expected
future) utility u dependent on the current purchase of cars, q1 and q2, and income m net of
purchase expenditures x :
maxq1,q2 u (q1, q2,m − x) s.t. pc1q1 + pc2q2 = x, (1)
where pci are costs per quantity, including registration taxes aswell as future variable costs and
annual taxes. The utility function satisfies the standard assumptions on continuity, differen-
tiability, positive derivatives, and concavity.We also assume that both types are normal goods
(increasing consumption with increasing income, decreasing consumption with increasing
prices) and that the total budget for cars, x , increases in total income, m.
We do not model consumers’ care about the environmental performance of cars as such
(see Achtnicht 2012 for an analysis along those lines), but focus on the effects of government
instruments geared to direct consumers’ choices. We assume that the tax is fully shifted to
consumers,10 so that the consumer price of cars is
pci = (1 + τi ) ppi , (2)
where τi is a type-specific ad valorem tax and p
p
i is the producer price.
The tax τi consists of a uniform component ϕ and an environmental component, where θ is
a relative weight of the environmental component. The two car types have different emission
intensity, say grams of CO2 per km, which we denote by βi . Without loss of generality, let
β2 > β1, for example because car type 2 is more spacious, has more weight, or is more fancy.
The type-specific tax becomes:
τi = ϕ + θβi . (3)
We are interested in the effect of changes in car taxes on the average CO2 intensity of the car
fleet, which we define as
B = β1q1 + β2q2
q1 + q2 . (4)
8 Note that Ryan et al. (2009) weigh the registration tax measure by vehicle sales, so that in their analysis
the right-hand-side variable depends on policy outcomes. To prevent dependency of right-hand variables on
policy outcomes, we construct tax measures that do not use sales for weighing; see footnote 15.
9 We consider the aggregate level and treat the number of cars as a continuous variable.
10 We abstract here from strategic pricing by car manufacturers. Though this is important as a mechanism,
our results below will hold as long as the car manufacturers pass-through part of taxes. In general, ad valorem
taxes may be under- or overshifted under Bertrand competition with differentiated products (Anderson et al.
2001). If car manufacturers differentiate prices between countries so as to partly compensate taxes, the effect
of fiscal measures will be reduced, and our coefficients will become smaller and less significant.
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Policy can change the uniform component of the car tax, ϕ, the environmental component,
θ , or both. We define the average car-tax, given by
T = τ1q1 + τ2q2
q1 + q2 = ϕ + θB, (5)
so that we can study shifts in the tax structure while keeping a constant overall tax rate. It is
intuitive that an increase in the weight of car-feature θ , while keeping the average tax rate T
constant, will decrease the average emission-intensity of the cars:
Proposition 1 An increase in the weight of environmental performance in taxes, θ , while




Proof The policy in the proposition increases the price of the relatively emission-intensive
car and decreases the price of the more fuel-efficient car. The result follows immediately
from the assumption that both car types are normal goods. unionsq
Thus tilting the car taxes to become more CO2-dependent will make the car fleet more CO2-
efficient. The effect of an overall car tax increase is more subtle. A price increase has a similar
effect as an income reduction. Car types with a high income elasticity thus tend to losemarket
share when taxes uniformly increase. The impact of the tax level therefore depends on the
comparative income elasticity of the two car types.
Proposition 2 If the environmental tax component θ is sufficiently small, then feature B
decreases with an overall tax increase ϕ (or equivalently an increase in T ) if and only if the
less fuel-efficient car type has higher income elasticity:
dB
d ϕ


















































. An increase in ϕ constitutes an equiproportional increase in the prices of all cars when
θ = 0. Since cars are a normal good (which we use in the middle equivalence), an increase
in car prices decreases demand for all types. When θ = 0, an increase in ϕ is equivalent to










, the average CO2-intensity B goes down. By continuity, the result also
holds for θ sufficiently small. unionsq
The typical hypothesis asserts that demand for luxurious cars is more income-elastic. Man-
nering and Winston (1985) find that large and mid-size cars have a higher income elasticity
on average than compact cars. A meta-analysis by Goodwin et al. (2004) finds that fuel con-
sumption is more income-elastic than traffic volume, which is consistent with the idea that
wealthier consumers buy less fuel-efficient cars. Heffetz (2011) documents larger income
elasticities for more visible consumption categories for a wide array of expenditures.
Larger cars, which are also emission-intensive, tend to be more comfortable. For example,
they offer more storage and lower occupant fatality rates in vehicle-to-vehicle crashes—
attributes that are more easily dispensable than a car’s basic transportation service. The
proposition predicts a decrease in the averagepollution intensity if the uniform taxϕ increases.
Indeed, Bordley (1993) obtains higher (Hicksian) price elasticities for luxury car segments,
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which together with their higher income elasticity also corroborates Proposition 2. The above
literature is also consistent with our own finding reported in Table 6.
For high environmental taxes θ the effect may be reverted, as an increase in the uniform
tax rate ϕ can then represent a fall in the relative price of less fuel-efficient cars. As we will
see however, the relative importance of the environmental component in total car taxes is
modest in European countries, so that the proposition’s condition seems to apply.
In the next section, we construct the country–tax variables. The variable construction will
closely follow the decomposition in Eq. (3), where, θ and βi will respectively be the average
country–year specific tax rate, and the increase in the tax rate (θ) for a given increase in
car-specific CO2 emissions (βi ). We then test Propositions 1 and 2 by estimating the effect of
the tax system variables (ϕ and θ ) on the average CO2 intensity of newly purchased vehicles
(B in Eq. 4).
4 Data
Here we describe the data used for the empirical analysis. The dependent variable of interest
is the average CO2 intensity of newly purchased vehicles, which depends on substitution
patterns between more and less fuel efficient cars, but also on common fuel efficiency
improvements over all cars, which in our econometric strategy is absorbed by time fixed
effects. The main explanatory variables are fuel taxes and the two coefficients used in the
model in Sect. 3: the average level of registration and annual road taxes, and their CO2 sen-
sitivity. Here, we define the vehicle registration tax as all one-off taxes paid at the time the
vehicle is registered, which is usually the time of acquisition. For road taxes, we include all
annual recurrent taxes of vehicle ownership. We construct these data for each country, year,
and fuel type in our sample using a detailed database with vehicle registration taxes and road
taxes at vehicle–country–year level.
4.1 Data Sources
Our first data source is a set of manufacturer price tables as supplied by the European Com-
mission (2011a). These tables form an unbalanced panel with 11930 observations on prices
and registration taxes, across 204 car types, 20 countries (15 countries up to 2005) over the
years 2001–2010. Petrol cars make up about two-third of all observations.11 This source
includes the retail price data per country inclusive and exclusive of the registration tax, and
allows us to construct the vehicle–country–year specific registration tax. As of 2011, the
European Commission no longer collects data on automobile prices. As these prices are a
crucial part of our analysis, our series end in 2010. Next we construct vehicle–country–year
specific road taxes using our second data source: the ACEA (2010) tax guides and the Euro-
pean Commission (2011a) passenger car dataset. We also take information on fuel taxes from
the ACEA tax guides. Because most cars are petrol or diesel, we restrict our sample to these
two fuel types. The dataset does not contain car-specific sales data.12
The dataset fromCampestrini andMock (2011) contains information on the CO2 intensity
of the newly purchased diesel and petrol cars (CO2 emissions in g/km, weighted by sales)
and the shares of diesel cars (see Fig. 5 in “Appendix”). We have this information for the
11 Dvir and Strasser (2014) use the same data for an analysis of manufacturers’ price dispersion on the EU
car market.
12 This poses no problem for the construction of the country tax proxies, as these are based on an unweighted
sample of most-sold cars.
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Fig. 1 CO2 emission-intensity for new cars, EU15 average (the figures averages over 15 countries without
weights). Source: Campestrini and Mock (2011)
Fig. 2 CO2 emission-intensity for new petrol cars, by country. Source: Campestrini and Mock (2011)
EU15 countries, from 2001 to 2010. As shown in Fig. 1, over this period, CO2 intensity has
come down remarkably, albeit with sizable differences across countries (Fig. 2). Lastly, data
on nominal per capita GDP is taken from Eurostat (2014). We deflate all prices (sales prices,
taxes, GDP) using a common EU15 price deflator.13
4.2 Constructing Country Average and CO2 Sensitivity of Car Taxes
Countries have widely divergent rules for registration and road taxes. In some countries,
vehicle registration taxes are based on CO2 emissions, in others, the cylindrical content is
used to compute the tax, or the sales price of the car. In many instances, registration taxes
13 The deflator is constructed using a weighted average of the EU15 countries’ individual inflation rates,
according to standard EU methodology. See https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/prices/hicp/html/index.en.html.
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combine multiple variables. Rules for annual road taxes vary evenmore across Europe. Some
countries base their annual tax on a car’s engine power (in kWor hp),while other countries use
cylinder capacity, CO2 emissions, weight and exhaust emissions. In addition to the dispersion
between countries, for both registration and road taxes, many countries have changed their
policies over the period 2001–2010; they adopted (temporary) discounts for fuel efficient
cars, or additional charges for cars exceeding specified standards.14 We compare tax systems
across countries by characterizing each country’s tax system at year t by the two coefficients
used in our model in Sect. 3. The first coefficient describes the country–year average tax, the
second the CO2 sensitivity of the tax. Both variables are computed for both the registration
and road tax, and for petrol and diesel. We thus construct 8 variables that characterize a
country’s vehicle tax system for a given year.
We now provide the details. Let CO2i t be the CO2 intensity of car-type i in year t ,
τci t the (registration or road) (percentage) tax in country c, and let δci t be the index {0,1}
identifying whether the data are available for country c. For the sake of exposition, we do not
use subscripts for fuel and tax type (registration vs. road). We construct the country-specific









i δci tτci t∑
i δci t
. (9)
That is, the typical car for a country has emissions CO2ct and pays a tax rate τ¯ct . We
subsequently calculate the CO2-sensitivity of the tax by comparing how much, for each
country–year, the vehicle-specific tax increases for a given increase in the vehicle’s CO2
emissions, on average, and weighted:
CO2TAXct =
∑
i wci t (τci t − τ¯ct )∑
i wci t
(
CO2i t − CO2ct
) , (10)
where weights are given by the deviation of the vehicle CO2 intensity from the typical CO2
intensity:
wci t = δci t
(
CO2i t − CO2ct
)
. (11)
The squared weights ensure that the denominator in (10) is strictly positive, and that the
CO2 sensitivity is mainly determined by the tax-differences between the fuel-efficient and
fuel-intensive cars.
Yet, if we want to determine a country’s tax pressure and compare between countries, we
should not consider the tax of the typical car for that country, but the tax for a typical car that
is the same over all countries. Thus, we construct the (virtual) tax rate that would apply to a
car with a CO2-emission profile

CO2t that is typical for the set of all countries:
14 van Essen et al. (2012) provides a detailed overview of the of the parameters used for the calculation of
the registration and road taxes, as well as the tax for a representative vehicle, across the European countries.
15 In the construction of our tax system variables we do not weigh by sales, to prevent our description of the
tax system from being contaminated by the subsequent effects of that same tax system. The tax system may
of course affect sales, and thereby the CO2 emission intensity of newly purchased cars. This is discussed in
Sect. 6.
123




c,i δci tCO2i t∑
c,i δci t
, (12)






The abovemethod generates 8 variables for each country–year pair. The precise interpretation
depends on the details of the input variables, CO2i t and τci t . If CO2 emissions are measured
linearly in (gCO2/km), and taxes in euros, then τ¯ct is the tax in euros (e) paid for the carwith a
typical CO2-emission profilewhileCO2TAXct is the increase asmeasured in (e/(gCO2/km)).
If taxes are measured ad valorem, then τ¯ct is the typical car tax rate in percentages while
CO2TAXct is the increase in the tax rate per gCO2/km. Our preferred specification uses the
logarithm of one plus tax rates and the logarithm of CO2 emissions, so that variables are
interpretable as elasticities, and (with time fixed effects) the construction is independent of
price levels. In this case, a decrease of the variable τ¯ct of 0.01 means that the tax rate for
the typical car has fallen by 1%. If two car types are completely identical (including prices
at the factory gate), but one car is 10% more fuel efficient, then the consumer price of the
more fuel-efficient car is 0.1 × CO2TAX per cent below the consumer price of the more
fuel-intensive car. All estimations in the main text are based on the double-log variables. We
have reproduced our results for a linear model, which is presented in “Linear Model” section
of “Appendix”. The appendix also provides the equations with more elaborate references to
the details of taking logarithms.
Expressions (12) and (13) can directly be connected to Eq. (3) of the stylized model. Here,
TAXct resembles the country–year specific general tax rate (ϕ), with CO2TAXct the increase
in the tax rate for a given increase in vehicle-specific CO2 emissions (θ).
Figure 3 below shows a typical breakdown of the vehicle registration tax rate in its level
and CO2 sensitivity. The charts show the registration taxes paid in the Netherlands, in 2001
(left) and 2010 (right), for a series of petrol (upper) and diesel (lower) cars. The dots are
observations for individual car types, described at the beginning of Sect. 4.1. The lines present
the ‘predicted’ tax rates based on the two proxy variables TAX and CO2TAX constructed
above. As is immediately visible from the left and right panels, the tax rate has become more
sensitive to CO2 emissions between 2001 and 2010, that is, the slope of the line has increased.
Figure 4 shows the decomposition of the tax in its average tax rate and the CO2 tax over
the years 2000–2011. The levels of the predicted tax in the panels of Fig. 3 correspond to
the values in the left panel in Fig. 4, while the slope of the predicted taxes in the panels of
Fig. 3 correspond to the values in the right panel of Fig. 4. The average registration tax rate
for petrol cars started at about 50 per cent, and sharply dropped in the last years reaching
about 47 per cent in 2010 and 40 per cent in 2011. The CO2 sensitivity of registration taxes
however has increased substantially for both petrol and diesel cars between 2000 and 2011.
Figure 4 (right panel) illustrates this shift. Various tax breaks for fuel-efficient cars came into
force, which substantially increased the CO2 sensitivity of taxes, from about 10 to 25%, but
at the same time reduced the average tax. All other things equal, in 2011, the after-tax price
decreases by about 3% if a car is 10% more fuel-efficient. The charts in Fig. 4 also show
that, in the Netherlands, taxes for diesel cars are persistently above those for petrol cars;16
in our results section, we will come back to the effect of tax differentiation between petrol
and diesel cars.
16 The Netherlands is atypical in the sense that registration taxes and fuel taxes are used as instruments
to segregate the car market. Diesel fuel taxes are low (relative to petrol) while diesel registration taxes are
high (relative to petrol). The tax scheme intends to separate long-distance drivers (who buy diesel cars) from
short-distance drivers (who buy petrol cars).
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Fig. 3 Taxes per vehicle, dependent on CO2 emission intensity, for the Netherlands, 2001 (left panels) and
2010 (right panels), petrol (upper) and diesel (lower). Taxes are measured relative to car prices
Fig. 4 Registration tax levels for typical vehicle (left), and tax dependence on CO2 emission intensity (right),
for the Netherlands, 2000–2011, petrol (green solid) and diesel (black dashed). Note that the figure extends the
period (2001–2010) overwhichwe run the regressions.Also note that the y-axis on the left panel should be inter-
preted as ‘elasticity’: ln(1+τ). Thus, a value of 0.5 implies a tax of exp(0.5)= 65 per cent. (Color figure online)
Table 1 provides some additional summary statistics and the means for the first and
last sample years.17 Over 2001–2010, the average registration tax for diesel cars decreased
from 46 to 40 per cent (see footnote at table) while for petrol cars the registration tax rate
17 Tables 13 and 14 in the “Appendix” provide a more detailed overview of the country-specific constructed
registration and road taxes for the years 2001 and 2010.
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Table 1 Summary statistics for constructed tax levels and CO2 sensitivity for EU15
2001–2010 2001 2010
Mean SD Min Max Mean Mean
Vehicle registration tax rate
Diesel 0.35 0.24 0.14 1.12 0.38 0.34
Petrol 0.33 0.21 0.14 0.98 0.33 0.30
Vehicle registration tax rate, CO2 sensitivity
Diesel 0.07 0.13 −0.22 0.66 0.06 0.14
Petrol 0.10 0.14 −0.08 0.53 0.10 0.13
Road tax rate
Diesel 0.02 0.02 0 0.07 0.02 0.02
Petrol 0.02 0.01 0 0.09 0.02 0.02
Road tax rate, CO2 sensitivity
Diesel −0.004 0.01 −0.07 0.04 −0.015 0.003
Petrol −0.004 0.02 −0.10 0.05 −0.011 0.004
All numbers are based on a logarithmic representation. The average tax rate for diesel cars in 2001 was thus
exp(0.38) − 1 = 0.46. See Table 7 in the “Linear Model” section of “Appendix”, for the tax levels and CO2
sensitivity based on the linear model
decreased from an average of 39 to 35%. The extra tax paid for purchasing a high-emission
vehicle has increased substantially, however. In 2001, purchasing a diesel vehicle with 10%
higher emissions increased the registration tax rate by approximately 0.6 percentage point on
average. By 2010, this has increased to 1.4 percentage point. For some countries, the elasticity
of the registration tax rate with respect to emissions is negative. This does not directly imply
that fewer taxes are paid for polluting vehicles. If a more polluting car is more expensive,
then the absolute tax paid can increase while the tax rate paid can decrease.18
In 2001, the road tax rate is on average 2% of the vehicle’s (tax-exclusive) purchase
price, for both diesel and petrol cars. Several countries have no annual road tax. The average
elasticity of the annual tax rate with respect to CO2 emissions has changed from being
negative in 2001 to a positive value in 2010. Overall, there is a slight pattern towards lower
road tax rates, combined with a greater dependence of the tax rate on the emissions of a car.
Vehicle fiscalmeasures are correlated, alsowhenwe take out country and timefixed effects.
Petrol and diesel registration taxes move in tandem, both for the levels and CO2 sensitivity.
The same applies to the annual taxes, where correlations exceed 80%.19 Petrol and diesel fuel
taxes are also positively correlated. The year fixed effects separate fuel price developments
from fuel tax changes. There is almost no correlation between the three groups of tax instru-
ments. For annual taxes, we see a very strong negative correlation between the level of annual
taxes and its CO2 sensitivity, implying that the set of annual taxes are stronglymulti-collinear,
so that we must be careful when interpreting individual coefficients for annual taxes.20
18 This can happen if part of the registration tax is independent of the car price. Indeed, results from the
linear model presented in the “Appendix” show that in all countries, tax levels (weakly) increase for more
CO2 emission-intensive vehicles (see Table 7).
19 See Table 15 in the “Appendix” for details.
20 The negative correlation between the level of annual taxes and its CO2 sensitivity is ‘natural’ in the
following sense. If the level of annual taxes increase, typically they increase less than proportional with the
car’s size, weight and price. Thus, annual taxes have a tendency to be regressive. This is picked up by a negative
coefficient for the CO2 sensitivity.
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5 Econometric Strategy
The benchmark model estimates the dependence of the CO2 intensity of the new car fleet in
country c in year t (as in Fig. 2), separately for diesel and petrol, on the two dimensions of
the registration car taxes: its level and its CO2 sensitivity
CO2intct = α1c + α2t + β1TAXct + β2CO2TAXct +
∑
k
πk Zckt + εct , (14)
where α1c and α2t are country and time fixed effects, and the country–time specific con-
trol variables Z include income and gasoline taxes.21,22 For our preferred model, we use
logarithms for the dependent variable. In the linear model (see “Linear Model” section of
“Appendix”), the dependent variable is measured in average grams of CO2 emissions per
km.
We add convergence patterns through the control variable, through
Zc1t = CO2intc0 (15)
Zc2t = (yeart − 2001) × CO2intc0, (16)
where CO2intc0 is the CO2 intensity of the new fleet in the base year 2001. Convergence
between countries is measured through a negative coefficient for the interaction term (16).
We assume there is no systematic correlation between observed fiscal vehicle policies and
unobserved policies such as vehicle retirement plans that could induce omitted variable bias.
We first estimate the model for both fuel types jointly and separately,23 with and without
the annual taxes. This allows us to assess the effect of tax levels and CO2-intensities on
the emission intensity of diesel cars, petrol cars and the average fleet. We then attempt to
decompose these effects into effects stemming from substitution between fuel types, effects
from substitution between large and small cars, and effects from increased efficiency hold-
ing the car attributes constant. For this decomposition, we first add diesel share, average
mass and average horsepower to the control variables Z . Next, we replace CO2intct by
either of these three variables as the dependent variable in (14), leaving all other variables
unchanged.
6 Results
6.1 Fuel-Type Specific Effects
Table 2 displays the results for the CO2 intensity for diesel and petrol cars respectively.
Starting with the CO2 intensity of new diesel cars, we find a clear significant effect of
registration taxes on CO2 emissions. Especially the CO2 sensitivity is an effective instrument
to change the characteristics of newly bought vehicles: a 1% increase in CO2 sensitivity of
the registration tax reduces the CO2 intensity by about 0.1% (second row Table 2). We find
no significant effect for road taxes on the emissions by diesel cars. Higher diesel fuel tax
21 The fuel tax is calculated for each country–year–fuel type by fuel: tax= ln(1+{fuel tax level}/{fuel price}),
where we take the fuel price as the average fuel price across the countries.
22 In “Robustness with Respect to the Economic Recession” section of “Appendix”, we also check robustness
for other variables to control for the economic crisis. We do not control for the effects of carmaker-specific
differences in fuel efficiency improvements interacted with market share differences between countries.
23 In the latter case, we take the average and difference across fuel types for all tax variables, as opposed to
the only diesel or petrol-specific ones.
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Table 2 Dependence of new car fleet emissions on taxes, per fuel type
Dependent variable (log) CO2 intensity diesel (log) CO2 intensity petrol
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TAX registration −0.021 −0.027 −0.031 −0.028
CO2TAX registration −0.099** −0.095** −0.140** −0.136*
TAX road 0.182 1.746**
CO2TAX road 0.386 1.092**
Fuel tax rate −0.304*** −0.303*** −0.057 0.004
(log) income 0.251** 0.233** 0.193*** 0.150**
Convergence −0.051* −0.048* −0.028** −0.030**
Time FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 150 150 150 150
R-squared within 0.310 0.303 0.347 0.279
R-squared 0.915 0.914 0.973 0.970
Significance: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1. Observations are clustered by country. The R-squared
within is calculated for the residuals after both time and country FEs
rates increase the fuel efficiency of newly acquired diesel vehicles, as expected (Burke and
Nishitateno 2013). In addition, we find higher CO2 intensities with increasing income and a
clear convergence pattern between EU countries.
For petrol vehicles, the pattern is similar. The effect of CO2 tax sensitivity is nega-
tive and significant: the average CO2 sensitivity in 2010 (0.13) reduces the CO2 intensity
of new bought cars by about 2%. An increase in the registration tax level reduces the
CO2 intensity of newly acquired vehicles, but the coefficients are insignificant. For petrol
vehicles, annual road taxes receive a significant coefficient, yet the signs are opposite
to what is expected.24 Fuel taxes do not show a significant effect for petrol car pur-
chases.
In our regressions, even though the annual road tax rates enter significantly, excluding
them from the regression has only little effect on the coefficient for the other variables.
Hence, we can interpret the other coefficients with confidence, and conclude that leaving
annual taxes unaccounted for probably does not greatly alter our conclusions.
6.2 Aggregate Effects
Then consider the overall effect of car taxes on the new fleet emission intensity, as reported
in Table 3. At first sight, it looks as if registration taxes, and specifically the CO2 sensi-
tivity, have lost their significance as an important determinant. But this can be explained
by the high collinearity between the average and difference of the CO2 sensitivity of reg-
istration taxes.25 When both the average and difference in CO2 sensitivity are included in
24 This may in part be explained by the strong negative correlation between the level and CO2 sensitivity of
annual taxes (see Table 15 in the “Appendix”), which may introduce bias. In a regression where either of the
annual tax measures is excluded, the coefficient on the remaining measure is greatly reduced and no longer
significant.
25 After taking out time and country fixed effects, the correlation equals 0.81.
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Table 3 Dependence of car emissions (aggregated over fuels) on taxes
Dependent variable (log) CO2 intensity overall
(1) (2) (3)
TAX registration (average diesel and petrol) 0.096 0.079
TAX registration (difference diesel − petrol) 0.192* 0.148 0.202**
CO2TAX registration (average diesel and petrol) −0.131 −0.104 −0.131***
CO2TAX registration (difference diesel − petrol) 0.003 −0.005
TAX road (average diesel and petrol) 1.381
TAX road (difference diesel − petrol) 1.633* 1.471**
CO2TAX road (average diesel and petrol) 0.854* 0.135
CO2TAX road (difference diesel − petrol) 0.024
Fuel tax rate (average diesel and petrol) −0.121* −0.149 −0.101
Fuel tax rate (difference diesel − petrol) 0.127* 0.106 0.076
(log) income 0.158*** 0.148*** 0.136**
Convergence −0.029 −0.049** −0.033*
Time FEs Yes Yes Yes
Country FEs Yes Yes Yes
Observations 150 150 150
R-squared within 0.501 0.394 0.458
R-squared 0.974 0.968 0.971
TAX registration 0.050** 0.092*
CO2TAX registration 0.000*** 0.000***
TAX road 0.146
CO2TAX road 0.183
Fuel tax 0.086* 0.210 0.427
Differences are computed as {diesel}–{petrol}. Significance: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.
Observations are clustered by country. The R-squared within is calculated for the residuals after both time and
country FEs. The bottom 5 rows report the p values of the joint significance tests
the estimation, this collinearity causes coefficient estimates to be imprecise, and we lose
significance for individual coefficients. But, the joint hypothesis that neither the average,
nor the difference in the CO2 sensitivity of registration taxes has any effect is strongly
rejected, at p < 0.01 (bottom part of Table 3). If we only include the policy variables that
we expect to have the most important effect on the overall fleet’s CO2 intensity, we indeed
find a strong significant effect for the average CO2 sensitivity of the registration tax (third
column).
The average registration tax level does not affect overall CO2 intensity, yet higher reg-
istration taxes for diesel cars relative to petrol cars increase the average CO2 intensity of
new cars. As will be further discussed in the next section, this latter effect can be explained
by changes in the diesel share. For a given vehicle performance, diesel cars typically emit
less CO2. Lower overall taxes for diesel cars increase the share of diesel cars and thereby
decrease average overall emissions.
By subtracting the log of taxes in 2001 from those in 2010 (Table 1) and multiplying the
differences with the coefficients in Table 3, we find that the changes in registration taxes
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have reduced the CO2 intensity of the new cars by 1.3% on average.26 The overall effects
are modest; an explanation is that various countries with a major domestic car industry
(France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom) have relatively low registration taxes that are
almost independent of emission intensities. Interestingly, based on the results in Table 2,
we find that the changes in registration taxes over the period 2001–2010 have caused extant
diesel drivers to choose more CO2-intensive cars on average. For these drivers, the effect of
lower registration tax levels in 2010 compared to 2001 dominates the effect of the increased
CO2 sensitivity.
Along the same lines, we find that higher petrol fuel taxes tend to reduce the fleet’s
emission intensity, while diesel fuel taxes tend to increase average emissions, though the
effect is weak.
6.3 Transmission Mechanisms
Finally, we present an assessment of the transmission channels through which fiscal car taxes
change emissions. Consumers can switch between petrol and diesel cars, in response to tax
measures, but within a fuel type, they can also respond to tax measures by switching to
lighter cars with less powerful engines, or alternatively, they can choose for cars with more
fuel efficient engines while keeping the preferred car specifications unaffected (Fontaras and
Samars 2010).
In Table 4 we present, for diesel and petrol separately, the effect of fiscal measures
on the CO2 intensity with and without additional controls for diesel share, average vehi-
cle mass and engine power. Columns 1 and 4 show the overall policy effects, conflating
the changes in the fleet by those consumers that do not change fuel type, with changes
brought by consumers who switch to the other fuel type.27 Columns 2 and 5 control for
changes in the diesel share. Comparing column 1 versus 2, and column 4 versus 5, then
reveals the effect consumers switching between fuels at the margin, captured by the coef-
ficient for the diesel share. Columns 2 and 5 still conflate the policies’ effects through car
specifications (weight and power) with those reached through improved efficiency while
keeping car weight and power constant. Controlling for these in Columns 3 and 6 then
separates the efficiency effect from the effects through car specifications. We discuss the
effects of fiscal measures on CO2 emissions through the diesel share and car specifications
in turn.28
6.3.1 Diesel Share
Table 5 presents the direct effect of fiscal measures on the diesel share. As we see in this table,
a higher CO2 sensitivity of registration taxes increases the share of diesel cars. Buyers who
decide to acquire a diesel car as a substitute for a petrol car typically buy diesel cars that are
26 We usemore decimals than shown for the numbers in Table 1, so the reader’s calculationmay give a slightly
different result. Additional computations reveal that 0.9 percentage points of this overall effect is explained
by changes in the diesel share.
27 To allow easy comparison, columns 1 and 4 in Table 4 reproduce Table 2 columns 1 and 3 respectively.
28 The transmission channels included in columns 2–4, and 6–8 are endogenous, but the coefficient estimate
does not require instruments as the endogeneity is not related to potential reverse causality.
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Table 5 Transmission of fiscal policies to CO2 intensity; diesel share
Dependent variable Diesel share
(1) (2) (3)
TAX registration (average diesel and petrol) −0.978*** −0.815**
TAX registration (difference diesel − petrol) −0.684 −0.687* −0.876**
CO2TAX registration (average diesel and petrol) 0.348** 0.288 0.496**
CO2TAX registration (difference diesel − petrol) 0.076 0.114
TAX road (average diesel and petrol) −2.226
TAX road (difference diesel − petrol) −13.34*** −12.00***
CO2TAX road (average diesel and petrol) −1.147 0.112
CO2TAX road (difference diesel − petrol) −0.810
Fuel tax rate (average diesel and petrol) 0.762** 0.904*** 0.695**
Fuel tax rate (difference diesel − petrol) −0.802*** −0.704 −0.696***
(log) income −0.596*** −0.693*** −0.506***
Time FEs Yes Yes Yes
Country FEs Yes Yes Yes
Observations 150 150 150
R-squared within 0.640 0.333 0.566
R-squared 0.958 0.923 0.950
TAX registration (joint) 0.007*** 0.022**
CO2TAX registration (joint) 0.008*** 0.006***
TAX road (joint) 0.010***
CO2TAX road (joint) 0.567
Fuel tax (joint) 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.005***
Differences are computed as {diesel}–{petrol}. Significance: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.
Observations are clustered by country. The R-squared within is calculated for the residuals after both time and
country FEs. The bottom 5 rows report the p values of the joint significance tests
smaller compared to the average diesel car, while they substitute away from petrol cars that
are large compared to the average petrol car (see Rogan et al. 2011; Hennessy and Tol 2011;
Leinert et al. 2013). This finding in the literature is supported by our Table 4; we find that
the diesel share has a negative and significant coefficient in both Columns 2 and 5 (Table 4),
while these coefficients become substantially smaller once we correct for the average mass
and horsepower (columns 3 and 6). These consumers who substitute diesel cars for petrol
cars thereby reduce the average emissions of both diesel and petrol cars. Indeed, a closer look
at our data (not shown here) shows that diesel cars are on average 20% heavier compared to
petrol and the average weight for both diesel and petrol cars decreases with an increase in the
diesel share (see also columns 1 and 3 in Table 6). These observations jointly indicate that part
of the emission reduction of new cars in the EU has likely been achieved by lower registration
taxes (as observed in Table 1), which translated in an increased share of diesel cars (Table 5),
which are typically more fuel efficient than petrol cars, and thus in turn decreases the CO2
intensity of the average car. In addition to the average level of registration taxes across fuels,
higher registration tax levels for diesel cars compared to petrol cars tend to reduce the diesel
share (see the second row in Table 5), as does a lower average CO2 sensitivity of registration
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Table 6 Transmission of fiscal policies to CO2 intensity; vehicle mass and horsepower
Dependent variable (logs) Diesel Petrol
Mass Horse power Mass Horse power
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TAX registration −0.014 −0.185 −0.098 −0.231
CO2TAX registration 0.002 −0.024 −0.160*** −0.268***
TAX road −1.528 0.759 1.654** 3.615**
CO2TAX road −0.696 0.496 1.073** 1.911**
Fuel tax rate −0.235* −0.297 −0.030 0.024
Diesel share −0.086** −0.105** −0.042 −0.046
(log) income 0.116** 0.190 0.161** 0.408***
Convergence −0.003 −0.007 −0.014 −0.009
Time FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 150 149 150 150
R-squared within 0.195 0.205 0.324 0.390
R-squared 0.876 0.929 0.952 0.965
Significance: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1. Observations are clustered by country. The R-squared
within is calculated for the residuals after both time and country FEs
taxes (third row in Table 5). For fuel taxes, we find that higher diesel (petrol) fuel taxes
reduce (increase) the diesel share. Finally, higher road taxes for diesel cars reduce the diesel
share.29
6.3.2 Mass and Horsepower
Columns 3, 4, 7 and 8 of Table 4 confirm that emission intensities are higher when cars
are larger and have more powerful engines. Table 6 presents the effect of fiscal measures
on average mass and engine power. Adding mass and horse power reduces the (absolute)
coefficient on registration taxes in columns 3 and 7, and 4 and 8 of Table 4 compared to
columns1 and5, and2 and6, respectively, suggesting that registration tax levels affect average
mass or engine power of newly purchased vehicles. The effect is, however, statistically
insignificant inTable 6, so thatwe evaluate the evidence asweak.Wefind no effect for theCO2
sensitivity of diesel registration taxes on averagemass and engine power of newdiesel vehicles
(column 1 and 2, second row, in Table 6), but a strong significant effect for the CO2 sensitivity
of petrol registration taxes. Taken together with the negative effect of the CO2 sensitivity of
diesel registration taxes on diesel CO2 intensity, a possible interpretation of this finding is
that higher and more CO2-sensitive diesel registration taxes push consumer purchase choices
towards the technology frontier, providing the same qualities (mass and horsepower) to the
consumers, at lower CO2 emissions. For petrol cars, the effects of registration taxes appear to
be transmitted through the car features: higher (CO2 sensitivity of) registration taxes reduce
29 As before, the road tax level and CO2 sensitivity are strongly negatively correlated, which may bias results.
Re-estimating the model excluding either the level or CO2 sensitivity of road taxes changes neither the sign
nor significance of the individual effects, yet reduces the size of the effect by more than 80%.
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the average mass and horse power of newly purchased vehicles, even among consumers
who do not switch to diesel cars in response to the tax changes. There is less indication of
a technology effect, and more evidence of switch in the type of cars bought by petrol-car
consumers.
We note that the effects of income onCO2 intensities appear to be fully transmitted through
car features, both for diesel and petrol cars; the effects of income on CO2 intensity in Table 5
are no longer significant when we control for mass and horsepower. Results suggest that
increasing income is mainly used to increase the level of desirable features. We thus find no
evidence that consumers use income increases to purchase more environmentally friendly
cars. For diesel cars, the effect of diesel fuel taxes is also fully transmitted through the car
features.
7 Discussion
Wefind empirical evidence that fiscal vehicle policies significantly affect emission intensities
of newbought cars.AgreaterCO2-sensitivity of registration taxes lead to the purchase ofmore
fuel-efficient cars. A 1% increase in the CO2 sensitivity of vehicle purchase taxes reduces
the CO2 intensity of the average new vehicle by about 0.1%. The changes in registration
taxes from 2001 to 2010 have reduced the CO2 emission intensity of the average new car
by 1.3%. The diesel–petrol substitution induced by changes in the relative taxes for diesel
versus petrol cars is an important factor for the average fleet’s fuel efficiency. We also find
higher CO2 intensities with increasing income and a clear convergence pattern between EU
countries.
This paper is one of the first including annual road taxes, in addition to registration and
fuel taxes, in the analysis of car purchase behaviour. But contrary to Ryan et al., who found
that an increase in petrol circulation taxes of 10% could result in a decrease in fleet CO2
emissions of 0.3 g/km in the short run and 1.4 g in the long run, we find that an increase in
the annual road tax level and CO2 sensitivity increases the CO2 intensity of new petrol cars.
We are not sure what causes this finding. It is not obvious that individuals account for future
annual tax expenses, as discussed in Sect. 2. It is possibly because annual road taxes are not
salient, but the high collinearity between annual road taxes may also play a role.
We find that higher petrol fuel taxes tend to reduce the fleet’s emission intensity, while
diesel fuel taxes tend to reduce average emissions for the diesel fleet but also induce substi-
tution of petrol cars for diesel cars. The finding is consistent with Ryan et al. (2009), but a
subtle and important distinction from the general conclusion in the literature that higher petrol
prices tend to lead to more fuel efficient cars (Davis and Kilian 2011; Burke and Nishitateno
2013; Klier and Linn 2013).
There is a clear positive potential for fiscal instruments as part of the set of policy mea-
sures aimed at reducing CO2 emissions from cars.30 Our findings thus support the European
Commission’s third policy pillar. Yet, we should not overstate the contribution of registration
taxes. The overall effect of the registration tax changes that we identify, a 1.3% improvement
of fuel efficiency, is small compared to the overall achievement over the period observed
(Fig. 1). Innovation and other policy instruments have played a substantial role. In that con-
text, it is important to understand that various policy instruments can strengthen, but also
counter each other. In the European Directive EC/443/2009 car manufacturers are evaluated
(from 2015 onwards) based on their average emissions of cars sold across all EU countries.
30 See Burke (2014) for a broader discussion.
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Increased sales of fuel efficient cars in one country thus allows manufactures to sell more fuel
inefficient cars in other countries. The principle, sometimes referred to as a ‘waterbed-effect’,
implies that environmental gains from fiscal national policies can leak away as the sale of
more fuel-efficient cars in a country with a fiscal regime that puts a large premium on CO2
emissions, is countered by the sale of more fuel-intensive cars in other countries. National
fiscal policies, aimed at the demand side, and in line with the third pillar of EU policies, might
thus be less effective conditional on the effectiveness of the first pillar of EU policy, aimed
at the supply of fuel efficient cars throughout the EU. Given an exogenously set ceiling for
the EU-wide CO2 emissions, there is no clear economic gain from a diversified fiscal regime
between EU countries, while there are social costs (Hoen and Geilenkirchen 2006). Indeed,
a few years ago, the EU proposed to harmonize vehicle taxes in the EU, but the proposal was
rejected by the Member States. We also mention a few other potential disadvantages of fiscal
support of fuel efficient cars.
In this paper, we focus on the average emission intensity of new cars. Reducing taxes for
small, fuel-efficient cars can lead to scale effects (i.e. more cars) and intensity-of-use effects
(i.e. more kilometres per car). Konishi and Meng (2014) show that in a green tax reform
in Japan, this scale effect offset the composition effect (i.e. a bigger share of fuel-efficient
cars) by approximately two third. In addition, there is a rebound effect. Fuel-efficient cars
are cheaper to drive, and a portion of the CO2 gains by CO2-based vehicle purchase tax is
lost as the fuel-efficient cars increase car travel demand (Khazzoom 1980). The existence of
the effect is undisputed, but its magnitude remains an issue of debate (see e.g. Brookes 2000;
Binswanger 2001; Sorrell and Dimitroupolos 2008). Frondel and Vance (2014) estimated
that 44–71% of potential energy savings from efficiency improvements in Germany between
1997 and 2012 were lost due to increased driving. The rebound effect may be mitigated
if part of the increase in sales of new, clean cars is due to consumers sooner retiring their
less-efficient cars.
Of the policies aimed at reducing CO2 emissions, excise fuel duties most directly target
the environmental objective, specifically since the use of the car is accountable for about 80%
of CO2 emissions in its life-cycle (Gbegbaje-Das 2013). Fuel excise duties are also closer
to the ‘polluter pays-principle’, one of the leading principles of European Environmental
Policy (European Parliament and Council 2004). Taxing fuels would lead to more efficient
cars and lower mileage without rebound effects (Chugh and Cropper 2014), making it the
preferred instrument for reducing road transport emissions. Yet significant fuel tax increases
are politically costly.
There are also secondary effects of fiscal policies. When consumers choose lighter cars
that are more fuel efficient, not only CO2 emissions fall but emissions of NOx and PM10 as
well. Aweight reduction of 10% results in a decrease of the emission ofNOx with 3–4%NOx
(Nijland et al. 2012). On the other hand, substituting diesel cars for petrol cars improves CO2
fuel efficiency by about 10–20%, yet increases the emissions of NOx (Nijland et al. 2012). In
the case of PM10 the situation is not clear, as modern petrol cars with direct injection might
emit more PM10 than modern diesel cars (Köhler 2013). Lighter cars also reduce fatalities
for drivers of other vehicles, pedestrians, bicyclists, and motorcyclists (Gayer 2004; White
2004). The design of the fiscal regime, encouraging lighter cars or encouraging diesel cars,
can alter the secondary effects substantially.
We used CO2 emission data according to the NEDC guidelines. It is known that the tests
typically report lower emissions compared to realistic conditions, especially for cars that
score very well at the tests (Ligterink and Bos 2010; Ligterink and Eijk 2014). Moreover, the
gap between test results and realistic estimates for normal use have increased over time; from
about 8% in 2001 to 21% in 2011, with a particularly strong increase since 2007 (Mock et al.
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2012, 2014). The gap between test values and estimates of realistic use values also affects
the estimated emission of air pollutants, particularly the emissions of NOx from diesel cars
(e.g. Hausberger 2006; Vonk and Verbeek 2010). To continue the use of test-cycles therefore
requires an update of procedures and improvement of their reliability as predictor of real-life
use.
Finally, we mention three limitations of our study. We proxy the fiscal treatment of per-
sonal vehicles, assuming that taxes change continuously with CO2 emissions. Yet, there
are indications that consumers are more sensitive to discrete price increases, such as tax
breaks for cars that meet specific criteria (see e.g. Finkelstein 2009; Klier and Linn 2015;
Kok 2013). This study did not explicitly model these elements of tax design. Second, about
half of the new sales in Europe are company cars (Copenhagen Economics 2010). One of
the reasons for their widespread use is their beneficial tax treatment (Gutierrez-i-Puigarnau
and van Ommeren 2011), including implicit subsidies as employees often do not bear the
variable costs of private use (Copenhagen Economics 2010). Therefore, private consumers
and business consumers react differently to price signals such as fiscal rules and fuel taxes.
We do not have available data on the two separate markets and must leave this topic to future
research. Third, we did not consider other fiscal measures such as the scrap subsidies which
had major effects on sales in various countries, though the effects on the fuel efficiency is
considered limited (Grigolon et al. 2016).
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Appendix
Loglinear Detailed Model of Sect. 4.2
We construct the country–car–year variables LOGCO2i t = ln(CO2i t ) and LOGTAXcit =
ln(1 + τci t ) from our database, and subsequently construct the country averages [Eqs. (8),
(9)], denoted by a bar over the variables:
LOGCO2ct =
∑





i δci t LOGTAXcit∑
i δci t
(18)
We subsequently calculate the CO2 sensitivity of the tax (10), LOGCO2TAXct , by comparing










LOGCO2i t − LOGCO2ct
) (19)
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where weights are given by the deviation from the average CO2 intensity (11):
wci t = δci t
(
LOGCO2i t − LOGCO2ct
)
(20)
We then construct the (virtual) tax rate LOGTAXct that would apply to a car with a CO2-




c,i δci t LOGCO2i t∑
c,i δci t
(21)
LOGTAXct = LOGTAXct + LOGCO2TAXct (LOGCO2t − LOGCO2ct ) (22)
The two constructed variables LOGTAXct and LOGCO2TAXct , are used as independent
variables explaining the average emission intensity of the new car fleet (14). Note that the
country–average CO2 intensity constructed in (8) or (17) is not the same variable used in the
econometric regression, used as independent variable in Sect. 5 (14). The country–average
CO2 intensity in (8) or (17) is measured only for those car types for which we have price
and tax data, and its purpose is solely to construct the CO2 sensitivity of car taxes in (10) or
(19). The country–average CO2 intensity used in Sect. 5 (14) is from an independent source,
and is based on all car sales in a country–year; it is the independent variable that we explain
using the country tax variables constructed in Sect. 4.2.
Linear Model
In the main text, we characterized a country’s tax system by two coefficients: the average
rate, and its CO2 sensitivity, which is defined as elasticity of the tax rate with respect to CO2
emissions. In this appendix, we take a linear approach. Here, the CO2 sensitivity is instead
defined as the increase in the tax level for a given increase in CO2 emissions (in grams per
km). To decompose the tax in these elements, we estimate




where τci t is the tax paid (in euro’s) for vehicle i in country c at time t , p
p
cit is the tax exclusive
purchase price, CO2i t the vehicle CO2 emission in g/km and

CO2t the average time t CO2
emissions in g/km. We then characterize a tax system by TAXct , which is the average tax rate
as a percentage of the purchase price, and CO2TAXct which is the additional tax, in euro’s,
per g/km additional CO2 emissions.31
Table 7 presents the summary statistics equivalent to Table 1, as the numbers in this table
are potentially easier to interpret. Consistent with the results for the logarithmic model, we
find that from 2001 to 2010, the average registration taxes have fallen, yet its CO2 sensitivity
has increased, for petrol and diesel cars. For example, for diesel cars, the average registration
tax fell from 53% in 2001 to 44% in 2010. In 2001 however, emitting an additional 10
gCO2/km would increase the tax by 88 euros on average. In 2010, this has increased to 382
euros. Adjusting the decomposition slightly alters the estimation of the average tax rate. In
Table 1, the 2001 (2010) diesel registration tax rate is 46 (40)%, for petrol this is 39 (34)%;
in Table 7 these rates are approximately 7 percentage points higher.
With this decomposition, we consider the effect of the vehicle registration tax rate, and
the CO2 sensitivity of the tax paid on the average CO2 intensity of newly purchased vehicles.
31 Note that this simultaneous estimation of TAXct and CO2TAXct is not a departure from the decomposition
strategy in Sect. 4.2, as the decomposition in the main text is equivalent to estimating τci t = TAXct +
CO2TAXct (CO2i t − CO2t ), with all variables as defined in Sect. 4.2.
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Table 7 Summary statistics for constructed coefficients for EU15-linear model
2001–2010 2001 2010
Mean SD Min Max Mean Mean
Vehicle registration tax rate
Diesel 0.48 0.45 0.15 2.23 0.53 0.44
Petrol 0.47 0.45 0.15 2.09 0.46 0.42
Vehicle registration tax, CO2 sensitivity
Diesel 17.4 33.10 −76.67 151.80 8.8 38.2
Petrol 23.2 39.73 −9.56 189.08 20.5 32.3
Road tax rate
Diesel 0.02 0.01 0 0.06 0.02 0.02
Petrol 0.01 0.01 0 0.07 0.02 0.01
Road tax, CO2 sensitivity
Diesel −0.49 2.01 −9.08 7.99 −1.38 0.28
Petrol −0.84 2.28 −12.27 5.71 −1.48 −0.02
Tax rates are measured as percentage of the tax exclusive purchase price, CO2 sensitivity in euro per gCO2/km
For this table, data are not weighted
Table 8 Dependence of new car fleet emissions on taxes, per fuel type, linear model
Dependent variable CO2 intensity diesel CO2 intensity petrol
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TAX registration −7.982 −6.329 −22.51*** 2.892 2.620 0.257
CO2TAX registration −0.032 −0.033 −0.005 −0.072 −0.079* −0.052
TAX road 102.55 73.20 127.5 207.7
CO2TAX road −0.095 −0.260 0.553 0.683
Fuel tax rate −35.50** −36.71** −18.71 −5.705 −2.812 0.692
Diesel share −30.07*** −9.874*
(log) income 36.79** 38.64** 11.67 29.45*** 25.92*** 21.42**
Convergence −0.042 −0.045 −0.014 −0.047*** −0.049*** −0.039***
Time FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 150 150 150 150 150 150
R-squared within 0.295 0.289 0.472 0.406 0.392 0.437
R-squared 0.909 0.908 0.932 0.974 0.973 0.975
Significance: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1. Observations are clustered by country. The R-squared
within is calculated for the residuals after both time and country FEs
Results are presented in Tables 8 and 9, where the former table also includes results for the
diesel share as a transmission mechanism. Since we now take the level of the additional tax
on CO2 emissions, and the level of the average CO2 intensity of newly purchased vehicles
interpretation is slightly different compared to Tables 2 and 3. Take for example the first
column of Table 8. Here, a 10 percentage point increase in the vehicle registration tax rate is
expected to reduce the CO2 intensity of diesel cars by 0.8 gCO2/km. Similarly, the coefficient
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Table 10 Summary statistics for constructed tax levels and CO2 sensitivity for EU15—pooled
2001–2010 2001 2010
Mean SD Min Max Mean Mean
Vehicle registration tax rate 0.34 0.22 0.14 1.04 0.34 0.32
Vehicle registration tax rate, CO2 sensitivity 0.09 0.13 −0.05 0.50 0.10 0.14
Road tax rate 0.02 0.01 0 0.08 0.02 0.02
Road tax rate, CO2 sensitivity −0.004 0.02 −0.09 0.04 −0.01 0.005
∗ Tax rates are measured as percentage of the tax exclusive purchase price, CO2 sensitivity in euro per
gCO2/km. Note: For this table, data are not weighted
Table 11 Dependence of car emissions (aggregated over fuels) and diesel share on taxes—pooled
Dependent variable CO2 intensity overall Diesel share
(1) (2) (5) (6)
TAX registration 0.031 0.036 −0.896 −0.821*
CO2TAX registration −0.102* −0.088* 0.283 0.245
TAX road 0.610 −0.714
CO2TAX road 0.611 −2.317
Fuel tax rate (average) −0.171** −0.157* 0.992*** 0.936***
Fuel tax rate (difference) 0.108 0.101 −0.632 −0.677
(log) income 0.177*** 0.157** −0.859*** −0.736***
Convergence −0.051*** −0.052**
Time FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 150 150 150 150
R-squared within 0.387 0.359 0.365 0.299
R-squared 0.968 0.966 0.927 0.919
Significance: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1. Observations are clustered by country. The R-squared
within is calculated for the residuals after both time and country FEs
of−0.032 onCO2TAX registration implies that a 10 euro increase in the effective registration
tax rate on CO2 emissions for diesel cars, is expected to reduce the average CO2 intensity of
diesel cars by 0.32 gCO2/km. The sign of coefficients is in line with the logarithmic model,
but we lose many significant coefficients, indicating that the logarithmic model provides
more precise estimates.
Pooled Model
In the main text, we distinguish between taxes paid on diesel and petrol vehicles. This is
motivated by a clear difference in the taxes levied across the two fuel types (see Tables 1,
13, 14), as well as the large shift in diesel shares and the fact that it seems to be driven
by differences in tax treatment. However, as Table 15 shows, tax rates paid for diesel and
petrol vehicles are strongly correlated, inflating standard errors of the individual regressors.
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To address this issue, we have estimated a ‘pooled’ model. For this estimation, the tax
variables are no longer constructed for each fuel types, but rather generally, across fuel types.
Table 10 below reproduces Table 1 for the pooled setup. The constructed tax levels and CO2
sensitivities lie approximately in between those for the fuel type-specific ones. Table 11 then
shows our estimation results. Estimations are both qualitatively and quantitatively in line
with the results of Table 3, where the pooled model seems to capture mostly the estimated
effect of the average level of either TAX or CO2TAX in Table 3.
Table 3 also shows that for TAX registration and TAX road, the differences across fuel
types are relevant, which is an effect the pooled model cannot capture.
Table 12 Dependence of car emissions (aggregated over fuels) and diesel share on taxes
Dependent variable (log) CO2 intensity overall
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TAX registration (average) 0.096 0.097 0.097 0.054
TAX registration (difference) 0.192* 0.192* 0.196* 0.185
CO2TAX registration (average) −0.131 −0.130 −0.134* −0.139*
CO2TAX registration (difference) 0.003 0.003 0.004 −0.011
TAX road (average) 1.381 1.381 1.381 1.219
TAX road (difference) 1.633* 1.638* 1.646* 1.631*
CO2TAX road (average) 0.854* 0.853* 0.844* 0.703
CO2TAX road (difference) 0.024 0.025 0.016 0.021
Fuel tax rate (average) −0.121* −0.121* −0.128* −0.090
Fuel tax rate (difference) 0.127* 0.126* 0.134 0.166**
(log) income 0.158*** 0.187 0.161***
(log) income squared −0.001
Income 0.003**
Unemployment 0.0004
Convergence −0.029 −0.029 −0.029 −0.035
Time FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 150 150 150 150
R-squared within 0.501 0.501 0.502 0.479
R-squared 0.974 0.974 0.974 0.973
TAX registration (joint) 0.050** 0.099* 0.019** 0.130
CO2TAX registration (joint) 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000***
TAX road (joint) 0.146 0.177 0.153 0.161
CO2TAX road (joint) 0.183 0.185 0.212 0.337
Fuel tax (joint) 0.086* 0.112 0.150 0.088*
Differences are computed as {diesel}−{petrol}. Significance: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.
Observations are clustered by country. The R-squared within is calculated for the residuals after both time and
country FEs. The bottom 5 rows report the p values of the joint significance tests
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Robustness with Respect to the Economic Recession
To further explore whether our results may be driven by the recession, we perform additional
sensitivity analysis. Table 12 presents the full model with all controls (except the transmission
mechanisms), where we allow for (1) a quadratic relationship between CO2 intensity and log
income, (2) unemployment to determine CO2 intensity in addition to log income, and (3) a
relationship between CO2 intensity and the income level (in 1000 euros). The first column
reproduces the result from Table 3 in the main text. Overall, we find that our results are robust
to this alternative specification.
Additional Figures and Tables
See Tables 13, 14, 15 and Fig. 5.











Diesel Petrol Diesel Petrol Diesel Petrol Diesel Petrol
Austria 0.31 0.26 0.10 0.10 0.051 0.079 −0.068 −0.087
Belgium 0.20 0.19 −0.03 0.00 0.024 0.015 0.003 −0.002
Denmark 1.12 0.98 0.30 0.43 0.038 0.034 −0.012 0.023
Finland 0.63 0.63 0.03 0.08 0.027 0.040 −0.028 −0.047
France 0.19 0.18 −0.02 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Germany 0.17 0.15 −0.06 0.00 0.014 0.007 −0.010 −0.005
Greece 0.57 0.33 0.66 0.33 0.009 0.011 −0.019 −0.002
Ireland 0.49 0.44 0.11 0.11 0.025 0.025 −0.001 0.001
Italy 0.21 0.20 −0.07 −0.02 0.014 0.017 −0.008 −0.004
Luxembourg 0.16 0.14 −0.06 0.00 0.004 0.005 −0.003 −0.003
Netherlands 0.47 0.40 0.12 0.13 0.064 0.040 −0.040 −0.009
Portugal 0.47 0.43 0.03 0.23 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.001
Spain 0.25 0.22 −0.03 0.07 0.005 0.005 −0.003 −0.002
Sweden 0.24 0.23 −0.02 0.00 0.036 0.010 −0.016 −0.003
United Kingdom 0.20 0.17 −0.11 −0.02 0.020 0.030 −0.027 −0.029
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Diesel Petrol Diesel Petrol Diesel Petrol Diesel Petrol
Austria 0.27 0.24 0.16 0.16 0.025 0.028 0.000 0.005
Belgium 0.20 0.19 0.02 0.01 0.015 0.015 0.006 0.008
Denmark 1.00 0.89 0.25 0.53 0.025 0.024 0.010 0.024
Finland 0.46 0.43 0.35 0.23 0.023 0.035 −0.021 −0.030
France 0.19 0.19 0.03 −0.02 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
Germany 0.18 0.18 0.00 0.01 0.019 0.020 −0.004 −0.008
Greece 0.40 0.30 0.16 0.25 0.020 0.013 0.001 0.015
Ireland 0.42 0.39 0.32 0.22 0.014 0.021 0.033 0.043
Italy 0.21 0.22 −0.03 −0.04 0.015 0.015 0.003 0.005
Luxembourg 0.15 0.15 −0.01 −0.01 0.004 0.007 0.008 0.004
Netherlands 0.46 0.38 0.26 0.26 0.068 0.038 −0.021 −0.008
Portugal 0.48 0.35 0.35 0.22 0.010 0.011 0.005 0.001
Spain 0.21 0.22 0.16 0.12 0.005 0.005 0.000 −0.003
Sweden 0.24 0.24 0.06 0.001 0.017 0.008 0.011 0.001
United Kingdom 0.19 0.18 −0.01 −0.05 0.007 0.010 0.012 0.011
Table 15 Correlation between fiscal vehicle measures
Registration Annual Fuel
Petrol Diesel Petrol Diesel Petrol Diesel






Level 0.67 −0.16 1.00
CO2 −0.21 0.61 0.24 1.00
Annual
Petrol
Level 0.06 −0.09 0.13 −0.07 1.00
CO2 −0.06 0.11 −0.13 0.12 −0.90 1.00
Diesel
Level 0.00 −0.09 0.08 −0.11 0.85 −0.75 1.00
CO2 0.08 0.13 0.02 0.18 −0.76 0.84 −0.76 1.00
Fuel
Petrol −0.03 0.09 −0.04 0.01 0.05 −0.04 0.04 −0.11 1.00
Diesel −0.03 0.10 0.03 0.07 0.14 −0.04 0.15 −0.09 0.75 1.00
Correlations for variables after taking out time and country fixed effects. In bold those >0.5. Annual taxes are
multi-collinear
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Fig. 5 Share of diesel cars in new fleet. Source: Campestrini and Mock (2011)
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